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ABSTRACT
This paper uses currency option data from the BMF, the Commodities and Futures
exchange in Sao Paulo, Brazil, to investigate market expectations on the Brazilian Real-
U.S. dollar exchange rate from October 1994 through July 1997.  Using options data, we
derive implied probability density functions (PDF) for expected future exchange rates and
thus measures of the credibility of the “crawling peg” and target zone (“maxiband”)
regimes governing the exchange rate.   Since we do not impose an exchange rate model,
our analysis is based on either the risk-neutral PDF or arbitrage-based tests of target
zones.  The paper, one of the first to use options data from an emerging market, finds that
target zone credibility was poor prior to February 1996, but improved afterwards. The
market anticipated periodic band adjustments, but over time developed greater confidence
in the Real.  We also test whether devaluation intensities estimated from these option
prices can be explained by standard macroeconomic factors.
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2An Options-Based Analysis of Emerging Market Exchange Rate Expectations:
Brazil's Real Plan, 1994-1997
This paper uses a new data set of options on the Brazilian Real / US dollar exchange rate to
extract market expectations, as embodied in the risk-neutral probability density function (PDF), of real-
dollar exchange rates over horizons of one to three months.  Unlike ordinary exchange rate forecasts that
provide only a point estimate of the future exchange rate, options-based forecasts, by permitting the
derivation of a PDF, describe a range of realizations and the probability attributed to each range.
This PDF-based approach is especially effective for an analysis of the Real/$ exchange rate,
which since the June 1994 Real Plan has been characterized by a combination of a crawling peg and a
target zone regime.   Over short horizons, the exchange rate has followed a crawling peg surrounded by a
“miniband,” but for long horizons, superimposed on the crawling peg, there has also been an official
“maxiband” with a fixed (non-crawling) central rate, floor, and ceiling.
The PDF’s derived in this paper enable us to compare market expectations embedded in options
with these two concurrent regimes.  From the derived PDF’s, we can identify any divergences between
market expectations and the existing crawling peg— e.g., whether markets in fact anticipated a faster
depreciation, and if so, where (relative to the crawling peg) probability was concentrated.  Relative to
single-point expectation of the future exchange rate, a great advantage of a full PDF is the ability to
disentangle magnitude and probability of expected depreciation— e.g., a high probability of a small
depreciation vs. a low probability of a large depreciation, with presumably very different policy responses.
For the longer-horizon fixed target zones, we can perform a similar decomposition of probability and
magnitude of depreciation, and moreover, conduct “arbitrage-based tests” of credibility, developed in
Campa and Chang (1996), that are virtually assumption-free.   Given these target zones, we are also able
to determine both “intensities” and probabilities of realignment, and to investigate possible economic
determinants of realignment intensity.  Thus, a single approach using dollar-Real options permits us to
analyze both facets of the post-Real Plan Brazilian exchange rate regime.
This work contributes to the growing literature on the use of options to characterize expected
asset returns, and in particular to predict currency crises. Recent empirical work using options to identify
the distribution of expected exchange rates includes Malz (1996) and Campa et al. (1997, 1998).  Papers
3specifically focusing on currency crises, especially the 1992 ERM crisis, include Campa and Chang
(1996), Malz (1996), and Mizrach (1996).   These can be contrasted against measures of devaluation risk
not based on options, as in Bertola and Svensson (1993), Kaminsky, Lizondo, and Reinhart (1997) and,
Svensson (1991).
The motivation for this research is two-fold: first, to use options-based estimates of the PDF to
compare and contrast market expectations with the two concurrent exchange rate regimes in the post-Real
Plan Brazil; and second, to observe the time path of market perceptions to gauge policy effectiveness over
time.  Furthermore, this is one of the first options-based tests of exchange rate regime credibility on an
emerging market.  Within emerging markets, this is also the first paper to deal with the data challenges of
exchange-traded options, rather than over-the-counter (OTC) volatility quotes.  OTC data are normally
subject to less observation error, and are by construction free of arbitrage violations. Hence, OTC data are
easier to interpret empirically.   Thus, results obtained here may have implications for applying this
technique to other emerging markets, including those with only exchange-traded currency options.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows.  Section I describes the theoretical
background behind the use of option prices to determine risk-neutral probability density functions
(PDF’s)— and for target zone regimes, the derivation of re-alignment intensities and probabilities, as well
as arbitrage-based tests of credibility.  Section II discusses the Real Plan and pertinent historical
background, including the “miniband” and “maxiband” regimes.  Section III introduces our option data,
provides summary statistics, and conducts a preliminary analysis.  Section IV investigates the behavior of
the PDF over time, and in the context of a crawling peg, describes the probability and magnitude
characterizing expected deviations from this regime.  Section V addresses the “maxiband” target zones,
estimated realignment intensities and probabilities, and arbitrage-based measures of credibility.  Section
VI explores the empirical relation between estimated intensities and standard macroeconomic factors.
Section VII concludes.
I.   Options-Based Indicators of Devaluation and Tests of Exchange Rate Band Credibility
Options— whose payoff depends on a limited range of future exchange rates rather than an entire
distribution— are able to provide more precise information than other financial indicators about the future
exchange rates expected by the market, and the amount of probability attributed to any given realization.
4In contrast, the forward rate, for example, can indicate only the mean of this distribution.  The advantages
of an options-based approach will be discussed further below.
A.  Options and the Risk-Neutral Distribution
We begin with a few brief definitions. A call option gives its holder the right but not the
obligation to purchase a fixed amount of foreign currency (in the case of Brazilian Real-US dollar options,
$1000 US) at a pre-determined price (referred to as the strike price or exercise price) in local currency.  A
put option gives the right but not the obligation to conduct the reverse transaction, i.e., to sell a fixed
amount of the foreign currency ($1000 US) for a given strike price in local currency.
An American option may be exercised at any time before its expiration date; a European option,
only on its expiration date.   Because the European option can be exercised only on a single date, an
analytical relationship known as put-call parity can be established between the price of a European call
and European put of the same strike.  This relation, which is derived from arbitrage restrictions, permits
the price of a call to be computed from the price of a put with the same strike, and vice-versa.  The
analysis in this paper focuses exclusively on relationships derived from European call options (though
some of the call option data were constructed from European put data via put-call parity).
It was first shown in Breeden and Litzenberger (1978) that the decline in the value of a European
call option due to an infinitesimal increase in the strike price equals the discounted risk-neutral
probability that the option will finish “in-the-money” (spot exceeding the strike on expiration).
Accordingly, the value of a call option (under risk-neutrality) at time T with a strike price K is then given
by
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where ST is the spot exchange rate at time T,  f(ST) is the risk-neutral density function for the spot at time
T, and iT is the domestic risk-free rate for an investment maturing at time T. The partial derivative of
equation (1) with respect to strike price K is:
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where F(K) is the risk-neutral cumulative density function of the exchange rate at time T, evaluated at
strike price K.  Taking the second partial derivative of equation (1) with respect to strike yields:
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This then provides a direct relationship between observed European call prices and the value of the
corresponding risk-neutral probability density function, i.e. the PDF.  Note that the call price is based on
the payoff (ST - K) multiplied by its risk-neutral probability f(ST), which incorporates both the actual
probability of that realization of spot and the value the market places on that state of nature. In other
words,  f(ST) is not necessarily the actual density function, since— because of risk— a dollar in one state
may be valued differently from a dollar in a different state.
Equation (3) is important because it provides the method by which the PDF can be extracted from
call prices.  If a continuous call price function twice-differentiable in strike exists, then the PDF is
uniquely determined.  In reality, such a continuous call price function is not available, but will be
estimated from discrete point observations using a method described in Section IV of this paper.
B.  “Intensity” of Devaluation or Realignment
When there are specific reference exchange rates in place, as in the case of target zones, a risk-
neutral PDF can be used to indicate the perceived probability of devaluations or “re-alignments” of
various sizes beyond that specific reference level.  By looking at only that part of the PDF representing a
deviation from the reference exchange rates, we can isolate the risk of a change in regime.  A summary
measure incorporating both probability and magnitude of change from given reference rates, over all
possible realizations deviating from these reference rates, can be termed an “intensity” measure.  Campa
and Chang (1996) define such an intensity as:
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6Intuitively, intensity G(T) is a risk-neutral probability-weighted average of all exchange-rate realizations
requiring a re-alignment, or under deviation scenarios beyond  S-overbar.   In other words, the magnitude
of realignment is multiplied by the risk-neutral probability of each realization.  Comparing equations (4)
and (1), the intensity of realignment is simply the future value of a European call with a strike price at the
upper-bound.  Mathematically,
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Though this call with a strike price at the upper-bound does not exist in most cases, its price (and hence
the intensity of realignment) is easily calculated once a risk-neutral PDF has been derived.
C.  Minimum Intensity of Devaluation or Realignment
In the absence of a complete risk-neutral PDF, Campa and Chang (1996) show how one can
compute a lower bound on re-alignment intensity using far fewer data points but relying on convexity
properties of the call price with respect to strike, and the existence of one credible second reference rate.
This method uses both an observed at-the-money option, as well as the hypothetical price of an option
whose strike price is the credible side of the target zone.  The latter option will always end in-the-money,
and hence can be evaluated as a bond or forward contract, since there is no uncertainty and no time value.
The method then relies on the arbitrage-based condition that call prices are always a convex and non-
increasing function of strike price.  Therefore, when the call is graphed as a function of strike, the point
corresponding to a call with a strike at the upper band (i.e. the realignment intensity) must lie above the
rightward extension of a line connecting CallS,T (a call with a strike at the lower band expiring at time T)
and any CallK,T  (with strike K below the upper band).   The following inequality summarizes this:
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D.  Arbitrage-Based Tests of Target Zone Credibility
Campa and Chang (1996) also develop two tests of band credibility relying solely on arbitrage or
convexity arguments, without assumptions about risk preferences. These tests will be used for analysis and
comparison in Section V.
7The first test (hereafter referred to as “Test 1”) is based only on a simple no-arbitrage restriction:
the maximum future spot rate cannot exceed any credible upper band.  At expiration, the payoff of a
European call equals, at most, spot minus strike.   Therefore, under credibility, the maximum value of the
call cannot exceed the present value of the upper band minus the strike.  Thus, credibility can be rejected
whenever
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Note that this test can be used even when there is only one reference rate.
The second test (“Test 2” from here on) is derived from convexity arguments and also provides
an upper bound for the value of a call with a strike between two reference rates, or within the bands of  a
target zone.  The argument is that under credibility, a call with a strike at or below the lower band will
always finish in-the-money, and therefore is worth exactly its intrinsic value.  This intrinsic value is S0/(1
+ iT*)-K/(1 + iT), where iT* is the foreign risk-free rate and S0 is the current spot.  Furthermore, a call with
a strike greater than the upper band will always finish out-of-the-money, and therefore be worthless. Call
value, when mapped against strike, is a convex function passing through these two points.   Therefore, a
straight line— since we do not know the degree of convexity of the call function, but do know that it
cannot be less convex than a line— connecting these two points must provide an upper bound on all points
in between.  Thus, credibility can be rejected whenever the call value exceeds this upper bound, or
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Notice that by rearranging the terms of Test 2, we can show that the RHS of Test 2 is equal to the RHS of
Test 1 times a coefficient less than one, provided the forward rate does not exceed the upper band.
Therefore, as long as the forward rate is within the band, Test 2 is always at least as restrictive as Test 1.
The one advantage of Test 1 is that it does not require the existence of a credible second reference rate,
and provides a valid test even in the absence of, for example, a credible lower band.  Test 2, in fact, is a
test of the joint hypothesis that two reference rates, or the lower and the upper band of a target zone, are
credible.
8This section has summarized four different (but related) measures of exchange rate band
credibility based on options data alone: (1) the PDF-based realignment intensity, when a full PDF can be
described; (2) the minimum realignment intensity, given a credible second reference rate, (3) arbitrage
test 1 (on one exchange rate band), and (4) arbitrage test 2  (based on lower and upper bands).   In terms
of how these four measures are related, recall that Test 2 is always more powerful than Test 1, but requires
more assumptions. There is also a one-to-one mapping between violation by Test 2 and a positive
minimum intensity of realignment, as both are based on convexity properties alone.
II.   The Real Plan and Relevant History
Brazil has been subject to high levels of inflation since the early 1980's, and had unsuccessfully
attempted to rein in inflation several times prior to 1994’s Real Plan.  Economic problems, in part, date
back to 1964 when the military overthrew the civilian government, resulting in military control of the
economy until 1985. (It was not until 1990 that the first popularly elected president was inaugurated.)
During this military-ruled period, Brazil pursued industrialization policies based on import substitution,
creating a number of large state-owned enterprises.  The government engaged in protectionist trade
policies to spur such industrialization and to create economic independence in key industries.  As a result,
by the 1980's, foreign investment in support of the inefficient industries collapsed, and hyperinflation
followed because the high levels of government spending could not be reduced in line with reduced capital
inflows.  By 1990, hyperinflation had been structured into the economy, through both indexation and
expectations, with the concomitant debilitating effects.
Prior to the Real Plan, several attempts were made to contain inflation, usually involving
combinations of wage and price controls, tightening of the money supply, tax hikes, and freezing of bank
deposits.  These all failed as the fundamental problem lay in expectations of high inflation and excessive
government spending.  Wage and price controls were often ignored by the private sector, as immediate
shortages often resulted, creating price pressure.  In many industries, cartels also prevailed, reflecting the
low degree of market competition.  Government spending proved difficult to curtail given large
entitlement programs in place, and vested interests resisting spending cutbacks and privatization of
government industries, particularly during a recession.  Fiscal troubles were compounded by a badly
written constitution providing tenure for government employees after only five years (making them
9virtually impossible to lay off), and guaranteeing individual states a right to share in the federal revenues
without restricting state spending.  An attempt to introduce a new currency in 1993, the Cruzeiro Real ran
into the same problem of inflationary expectations.
The Real Plan, introduced in December 1993 by Finance Minister Fernando Henrique Cardoso,
differed from the previous plans in that it directly addressed the problem of inflationary expectations.
Cardoso recognized that past inflation was being transmitted into future expectations by indexing and
various contract negotiations, as inflation figured into all wage and business contracts.  The idea was to
break this connection by creating a unit of transactional account in which price and wage contracts would
be negotiated and written, and whose value would be kept roughly equal to $1.  The official currency, the
cruzeiro real, would then be devalued against this unit.  The Unit was called the Unit of Real Value
(URV), and was introduced in March 1994.  At the same time, the constitutional links between revenue
and expenditure were circumvented by creating a special fund (Fundo Social de Emergencia - FSE) to
eliminate the public sector deficit, thereby addressing a fundamental source of inflationary pressure.  (The
creation of the FSE was necessary to avoid the structural claims guaranteed by the constitution to the
states and to entitlement programs.)  Four months after the introduction of the URV, the Real was
introduced.  The central bank (Banco Central do Brazil) committed not to permit a depreciation beyond
1.00 Real/$, though appreciation would be allowed.  Furthermore, a reserve ratio was implemented
requiring one American dollar to each Real emitted.
The result of the Real Plan was a reduction in inflation from 50% per month, as of June 1994, to
less than 2% per month by the end of the year.  Inflation has since then continued to drop, and in May
1998, 12-month inflation was 3.12%, its lowest value since November 1949.  The Real Plan has also had
positive effects on the rate of economic activity.  Brazil’s real GDP grew at an average annual rate of
4.0% during the four-year period 1994-1997, compared with an average annual growth rate of -0.2%
during the four years prior to the implementation of the plan1.
Exchange rate stabilization was an integral part of the Real Plan.  Upper and lower bands
(“maxibands”)— as indicators of the maximum possible movement up or down— were established in
                                                       
1 It is worth noting that measures to address the structural problems also appear to be proceeding.
Privatization of state industries is continuing, and the Brazilian Congress has agreed to several
constitutional reforms.  These include: the relaxation of protectionist provisions not mentioned here,
reform of the social security system, and provisions relaxing the excessive protections provided to pubic
workers.
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March 1995, at a rate of .93 and .88 Real/$.  Since then, they have been adjusted several times to allow
the Real to depreciate at a controlled rate.
While announcing these broader “maxibands,” the central bank in practice followed a “crawling
peg” system, in which the Real gradually depreciated, but remained within a “miniband” surrounding a
depreciating central rate .  Under this informal system, the Real’s central rate was devalued approximately
0.5%-0.6%/month, and central bank intervention assured that at all times, the spot rate would not deviate
by more than 0.25% (half the “miniband width”) in either direction.  In practice, the central rate was
devalued discretely by about 0.10% (although sometimes 0.05% or 0.15%) about 5-7 times per month.
Starting April 1997, the government started devaluing the central rate by about 0.7% monthly.  To
discourage speculation against the system, the actual magnitude and timing of these mini-devaluations
was kept slightly irregular.   Furthermore, the size of the minidevaluation would be smaller than the width
of the miniband itself, so the instantaneous direction of the spot rate could not be known with certainty,
discouraging “one way” bets.
While this system of a predictable crawling peg surrounded by a miniband provided short-term
stability in the spot rate, the government wished to maintain some flexibility in its commitment to the
exchange rate over longer periods such as several months.  To commit to a very narrow range, even one
surrounding a crawling peg, risked tying the government’s hands unnecessarily and inviting outside
speculation against the currency.  Thus, the government remained free to alter either the rate of
devaluation or the width of the miniband.  At the same time, the government also wished to provide some
indicative levels for medium-term forecasting.  This dual objective was reached by instituting wider
“maxibands.”  Though the exchange rate never technically violated these bands, the central bank adjusted
the maxibands as markets gradually approached the maximum Real/$ exchange rate, an event that has
typically occurred every six to twelve months (Figure 1) .
Since the original maxibands were implemented in March 1995, through the end of our data in
July 1997, the bands were changed on three separate occasions: June 22, 1995; January 30, 1996; and
February 18, 1997.  Since the end of our data, the maxibands were changed on January 19, 1998, to the
current upper and lower bands of 1.22 and 1.12 Real/$ respectively.   In April of 1998, the government
also announced that the lower end of the miniband would depreciate at a rate of 0.65% a month, while the
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upper band would depreciate at a rate of 0.75%, de facto widening the minibands over time.  Despite its
short history, the Real Plan appears to have been quite successful in taming Brazilian inflation and
establishing a relatively stable currency with a reasonably predictable rate of devaluation.  Given this track
record, the following sections will seek to investigate issues of exchange rate regime credibility— both the
crawling peg and the maxiband system— and how market perceptions of the distribution of Real/$ spot
rate have changed over time.
III.   Data Description
The data obtained consist of high, low, average, and last transaction prices for every trading day
of dollar futures (daily observations of contracts of multiple maturities), calls and puts (daily observations
of multiple strikes and expiries), and closing spot rates, from the Commodities & Futures Exchange
(Bolsa de Mercadorias & Futuros, known as the BM&F) in Sao Paulo, Brazil.  The data cover the period
from July 1994, shortly after implementation of the Real Plan, through July 1997.  Calls are initially both
European and American, until a 1995 shift in convention, making all calls expiring after October 1995
European.  All put contracts are European.
The BM&F was formed in July 1985 and began trading in January 1986. Currently, the exchange
offers a range of futures and options contracts on the US dollar, the Ibovespa (the Brazilian stock index),
sovereign debt instruments, inter-bank deposit rates, US-Brazilian interest rate spreads, gold, cattle, and
agricultural commodities.  With a total trading volume of 102.3 million contracts and a financial volume
of 6.1 trillion US dollars during 1997, BM&F is currently ranked fourth among the world's derivative
exchanges2.  In 1997, 39.7 million contracts traded were US dollar futures, 8.1 million contracts were US
dollar call options, and 71,820 contracts were US dollar put options3.  Total trading volume in foreign
exchange contracts has actually declined since 1985, but this is due primarily to increases in contract size;
financial volume has more than doubled from 1996 to 1997.   US dollar contracts for both futures and
options apply to the “commercial” (as opposed to financial) exchange rate on a notional amount of
$100,000.
                                                       
2 Bolsa de Mercadorias & Futuros 1997 Annual Report.
3 These figures are for contracts based on commercial US dollar rate.  Contracts are also available based
on the floating rate, however, these represent less than one percent of total transactions volume.
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In this paper, we focus on European call data, which significantly outnumber put data. Put data
were translated using put-call parity and used only to augment the call data if a corresponding call did not
exist.  The call data consist of 5855 observations from the time period with mixed American and
European calls, and 4837 usable (about 200 questionable observations were deleted) observations of the
later time period with purely European calls.  In addition, 218 put data observations were added from an
initial data-set of 530 put observations.  This revised data set forms the basis for our subsequent analysis.
In deriving the PDF and conducting credibility tests, we use futures prices as an approximation of
the forward rate, as in Bodurtha and Courtadon (1987).  US interest rate data are daily Eurodollar rates
for 1 day, 1 week, 1 month, 3 month, 6 month, and 1 year, obtained through Datastream .   Linear
interpolation between the two closest maturities along the yield curve is used to obtain the Eurodollar rate
corresponding to the options’ maturity.  For example, if an 18-day rate is required then we use a weighted
average of the 1-week and 1-month rates.  Brazilian interest rate data is computed using covered interest
rate parity, using the appropriate futures contract (whose maturity normally coincides with that of the
options), spot exchange rate (again the mid-point of bid and ask), and computed Eurodollar rate.  Since
we have closing spot and U.S. interest rate data, we use the last traded futures contract in each day’s
calculations.  Finally, exchange rate band information was obtained from the World Bank.
Macroeconomic indicators used in Section V to determine economic explanatory variables are
drawn primarily from International Financial Statistics (IFS) by the International Monetary Fund.  The
choice of variables, follows Rose and Svensson (1994).  The “real exchange rate" is constructed from the
nominal exchange rate (IFS code ...rf), the US PPI (IFS code 63BB.ZF ), and the Brazilian WPI (IFS code
63.Z.CF ).  “Output" is represented by industrial production (IFS code 66...b for the United States, Data
Stream code BRINPRODH for Brazil).   “Inflation" is the percentage change in the consumer prices (IFS
line 64...x).  The “trade balance" is the ratio of exports to imports (IFS line 70 divided by line 71);
"Reserves" are foreign exchange excluding gold (IFS code 1l.d) and “Money" is Reserve Money (IFS line
14).
In Table 1a, we report the mean and standard deviation of strike price over three maturity ranges
(i.e. 1-30 days, 31-60 days, and 61-90 days) and four time periods corresponding to different exchange
rate regimes.  Maturities vary because unlike over-the-counter option contracts, which have a fixed time-
to-expiration, BM&F standardized options and futures contracts settle on the first business day of the
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maturity month.4   Note that especially in the first time period (March 10, 1995 – June 22, 1995) even the
mean strike price was often outside the band.
In Table 1b, we report the distribution of these strike prices over time relative to the spot,
forward, and upper-band.  The concentration of strike prices is important for two reasons.  First, it
indicates in what exchange rate range market liquidity and interest were greatest.  Second, it will affect
the reliability of the PDF we extract from these data.  Generally, the PDF is most reliable in ranges
spanned by the observed strikes.  Notice in Table 1b that the distribution of strike prices has become more
concentrated over time: the percentage of strikes above the spot is increasing over the four periods, but the
percentage above the upper-band is decreasing over the four periods.  To the degree that market activity
reflects a concentration of expectations (to be verified more formally later in the paper), this pattern
suggests that market expectations are exhibiting less dispersion over time, and that the upper-band is
becoming increasingly credible (as indicated by decline in the percentage of strikes exceeding the upper-
band).
The behavior of the underlying Real-dollar exchange rate also appears to have shifted over these
periods. Table 2 reports the standard deviation of daily changes in the spot and forward rates.  These
standard deviations have decreased over the first three periods, a pattern coincident with less dispersed
expectations as suggested by the increased concentration in observed strike prices.
IV.  The Implied PDF and Expected Deviations from the Crawling Peg
A.  Estimation of the Risk-Neutral PDF (over 15-day periods)
We first use our option data to derive risk-neutral PDF’s corresponding to horizons of one, two,
and three months.  Because of data limitations, this procedure will require certain numerical
approximations, but the resulting PDF’s  provide potentially richer information about expectations than
simple point-estimate characterizations of expectations as provided by the forward rate or an econometric
model.
A common approach to deriving the PDF from option prices characterizes Black-Scholes
volatilities (“vols”) implied in option prices as a function of the strike price.  For any given date and time
                                                       
4 The exchange does offer a ‘flexible’ option contract that can be tailored to the issuers needs including
style, maturity, dollar value, etc.   However, data on these contracts were not available, and in any event,
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horizon, one can interpolate and extrapolate from existing implied vols to express implied vol as a
continuous function of only the strike price.  This function is commonly known as the “volatility smile”5.
The function is then transformed into a continuous call price function that is twice-differentiable in strike.
This approach does not require that the Black-Scholes model hold; indeed, the fact that implied vol varies
with strike rather than being constant across all strikes is itself evidence against Black-Scholes
assumptions.  Note that the numerical technique in this volatility smile-based approach can vary, as
discussed in Shimko (1993) and Campa, Chang, and Reider (1997, 1998).   In Shimko (1993), the method
applied in this paper, the implied volatility smile is fitted as a quadratic function of the strike. In contrast,
Campa, Chang, and Reider (1997, 1998) use the method of cubic splines.6
Table 3 reports, by option maturity and exchange rate regime, the mean and standard deviation
of the Black-Scholes implied volatilities extracted from observed option prices.  A number of stylized facts
are worthwhile noting.  First, in all cases but one, shorter maturities are associated with high mean
volatility.  When normally calm markets experience occasional periods of high uncertainty expected to be
temporary, implied volatility will increase, and most markedly for short-maturity options.  Longer-dated
options will also show a rise in volatility, but since the high-uncertainty state is not expected to continue
throughout the option’s remaining life, the implied volatility will reflect both the high-uncertainty period
and the normal lower-uncertainty period, thereby diluting the effect of the temporary high-volatility
period.  Second, by similar reasoning, the standard deviation of short-dated volatility will be the highest,
since longer-dated volatility will again reflect an average of high-volatility and low-volatility periods.
Third, the mean implied volatility is one to two orders of magnitude greater than realized volatility
obtained from the time series of exchange rate changes.  This is because implied volatility reflects the
presence of  “peso problem”— the risk of a rare but substantial exchange rate shock, in this case a
devaluation of the Real.  Throughout the periods in question, the Real has remained stable, or depreciated
only gradually against the dollar.   For the most part, in our very brief sample, the Real has avoided the
                                                                                                                                                                    
given the potentially unique structure of each contract, each observation would have to be individually
evaluated.   Furthermore, low liquidity would reduce the reliability of such data.
5 Volatility plotted as a function of the strike price often resembles a “smile” because Black-Scholes
implied volatilities tend to increase as the strike price moves away from the forward rate.
6  For a number of dates, we also fit a cubic spline (as in Campa, Chang, and Reider (1997, 1998)) to the
data, and obtain similar results to the quadratic, suggesting that the results are robust to the method used.
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large price movements reflected in options’ implied volatility.   Of course, in small samples, realized
volatility can very easily be substantially below implied volatility in the presence of a “peso problem.”
In our attempt to derive a PDF from the Brazilian options data, a significant empirical problem is
that, for any given observation date and maturity date, we observe an insufficient range of strike prices to
trace out a reasonably complete volatility smile. This prevents us from constructing daily estimates of the
PDF on all but a few dates. Also, as mentioned previously, options expire on the first business day of every
month, reducing the frequency to only monthly if we wish to compare PDFs with the same time horizon.
To overcome these data limitations, we make the assumption that the shape of the volatility smile remains
constant for a period of 15 days.  For convenience, we assign the period’s midpoint as the “observation
date” for each 15-day period.  For instance, for 60-day call options, implied volatilities are collected for
options ranging from 53 to 67 days to expiration.  Each volatility corresponds to a strike/forward ratio for
the collection period.  We convert each strike/forward ratio to an absolute price by multiplying by the
forward rate central to the period.   The implicit assumption is that during this period, the relationship
between volatility and the strike/forward ratio remains constant.
Aggregating option observations over such 15-day periods, we obtain a semi-monthly series of
PDF’s for 35, 60, and 91-day call options (the 35-day periodicity captured a greater spectrum of strikes
than did a 30-day).  Many of these PDF’s are estimated using over 20 data points on the volatility smile,
and most use over 10 data points.  Only in one case do we use as few as three options data points.   PDF’s
are discarded if the associated continuous call price function is non-convex, as occurred in two instances.
PDF's were also smoothed using an exponential smoothing technique, which removes non-monotonicities
or negative values on the posterior and anterior slopes.  When this technique is applied, if a non-
monotonicity or negative value is detected, the computed PDF at this point is modified to decline from the
previous value towards zero at an exponentially decreasing rate.
Figures 2a-c provide three-dimensional time series of risk-neutral PDF’s estimated using
numerical derivatives, for 35, 60, and 91-day options respectively.  The PDF’s are presented as a function
of the strike/forward ratio.  The first observation in any of the graphs is October 3, 1994 though the
continuum of observations does not in general start until June 2, 1995.  (The dates on the horizontal axes
are shown in reverse to facilitate a better view of the fluctuations in the estimated distributions over time.)
All time series appear to exhibit increasing skewness and decreasing kurtosis over time.  Positive
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skewness in this context indicates that a large depreciation of the Real is more likely than a large
appreciation. The increase in skewness largely stems from the disappearance of a downside tail, in the
region of Real appreciation.  Kurtosis, on the other hand, reflects “fatter tails,” relative to the lognormal
distribution.  Kurtosis (above that found in the lognormal distribution) denotes a relatively high
probability of extreme outcomes— holding volatility constant. These graphical results reinforce our earlier
inferences from the distribution of strike prices. Positive skewness confirms that the market perceives a
greater probability of a large Real depreciation than a large Real appreciation. Increasing kurtosis
indicates the relative increase in very large expected exchange rate changes, and hence conditional on the
level of volatility, less total probability of devaluation.  Towards the end of the sample, it is striking how
the part of the distribution below the forward rate is extremely concentrated in values very close to (but
below) the forward rate (i.e. small Real appreciation).  In contrast, for values above the forward rate, the
distribution quickly drops to zero for points beyond a 2% depreciation from the forward rate.  This is
consistent with the government’s stated policy of constant depreciation over time.
B.  Deviations from the Crawling Peg (Miniband) Regime
We now use these PDF’s to identify potential divergences between market expectations and the
existing crawling peg regime of 0.5%-0.6% per month.  We focus on possible Real devaluations of a
larger magnitude than the crawling peg, namely 2% and 5% over horizons of 35, 60, and 91 days
(approximately 1, 2, and 3 months).  All these combinations of devaluations  and time horizons represent
a rate of Real depreciation at least as fast as under the crawling peg, and usually more so.  For example,
the existing crawling peg would imply about a 1.5% depreciation over three months.
For each devaluation size (x%) and horizon, we calculate the “probability” of devaluations at
least x%.  “Probability” denotes the total amount of probability, not weighted by distance, representing
devaluations of at least x% from the current spot.  Graphically, this corresponds to the area under the
curve in the right-hand tail of the risk-neutral PDF beyond an x% devaluation. In contrast, “intensity”
denotes the total probability, weighted by the amount of depreciation beyond x%, of all devaluations of at
least x%.
Table 4 depicts the probability, at the start of each month, of a depreciation of at least 2% or 5%
over horizons of 35, 60, and 91-days.  A number of points are striking in this table.  First, the credibility
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of the crawling peg regime has improved consistently over time.  Late in the sample, probabilities of a
given depreciation (from spot) are much lower than early in the sample.
Second, within any of the three exchange rate regimes, the probability of a 2% or 5%
depreciation does not change markedly in the months just prior to the maxiband realignment.   In the first
regime, from August 1995 (when our data begin) through January 1996, depreciation probabilities remain
high  throughout these six months.  Beginning in February 1996, the probability of depreciation drops
significantly, and remains low even up to the February 1997 realignment.  This does not imply that
markets expected no maxiband realignment, as we will see in the following section.  Yet, the options data
indicate that any anticipated maxiband realignment was not expected to be accompanied by a large spot
depreciation.
Third, around times of realignments (the months preceding January 1996 and January 1997) the
probability of a 5% depreciation is usually far smaller than that of a 2% depreciation. This indicates that
the probability mass of a depreciation of 2% or more arises primarily from expected small depreciations—
i.e. between 2% and 5%--rather than expected large depreciations of 5% or more.  Thus, even when the
crawling peg regime is not perceived as fully credible by the market— i.e. some depreciation beyond the
usual 0.5%-0.6% per month is expected, much of the market’s “doubt” surrounding the crawling peg
regime is in the form of minor rather than major expected depreciations beyond the crawl.
Fourth, our estimates of depreciation risk prove extremely sensitive to news affecting the
Brazilian economic and political situation.  Probabilities of large depreciations increased considerably in
April and May of 1996.  This coincided with a humiliating defeat suffered in Congress by the Brazilian
government on Social Security Reform, a key part of the structural reforms under the Real Plan.
Likewise, in May 1997, bribery accusations against some Congress members resulted in a sharp temporary
rise in depreciation probabilities.  Table 5 lists certain key economic and political events that may have
played a role in the market’s perception of depreciation risk over this period.
V.   Empirical Findings:  Tests of Exchange Rate “Maxi-Band” Credibility
A.   Arbitrage-Based Tests (Daily Observations)
We now focus on Brazil’s “maxibands” and perform a number of tests, including the arbitrage-
based tests of band credibility using Tests 1 and 2 (equations (7) and (8) respectively) discussed in Section
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I of this paper.   We start by focusing simply on the behavior of the spot and three ranges of forward rates
(1-30 days, 31-60 days, and 61-90 days) against the band. We see in Figure 1a that there is no violation of
the upper-band by the spot.  In Figure 1b, for 1-30 day data, an ongoing violation of the upper-band by the
forward occurs only in the first target zone regime, although the longer-dated forward prices (Figures 1c-
d) do approach and at times cross the upper-band in other regimes just prior to subsequent adjustments.
The options-based test results are graphed in Figures 3a-l.  Figures 3a-f report the results from
Test 1 for options in three different maturity ranges (1-30 days, 31-60 days, and 61-90 days), while
Figures 3g-l report the results of Test 2 for the same maturity ranges.  We report two figures for each
maturity.  The first figure plots the observed price of the call option on a given date minus the
corresponding “maximum” consistent with credibility from all the options with the relevant maturity
range observed that day.  Positive values for Tests 1 and 2 constitute a violation of upper-band credibility.
If there are multiple call options observed on a given date, then only the maximum such statistic for each
date is reported.  On some days, these maxima include some calls whose strikes exceed the upper-band,
i.e. automatic violations of the target zone.  Recall that since these are arbitrage-based tests, a single
option can be sufficient to reject credibility.   The second figure reports for each day the percentage of the
observed options resulting in a rejection of credibility, indicating the concentration of market liquidity in
the non-credible area. This approach does not mix calls with different expiration dates, as these arbitrage-
based tests specifically refer to a given band width and time horizon.
Credibility of the exchange rate band is consistently rejected for the initial months of the
exchange rate band.  During all of 1995 and until the exchange rate realignment of January 30, 1996,
options with maturities beyond 30 days were consistently priced higher than their maximum value
consistent with credibility.  During this period, there also existed a large number of options traded with
strike prices larger than the existing upper band, i.e. automatic violations of credibility.  Using options
with maturities less than 60 days, we find credibility harder to reject from February 1996 until about
November 1996, with the exception of a few days around August 1996 coinciding with the turmoil caused
by the resignation of the Argentinean Finance Minister.  Options with longer maturities (more than 60
days) rejected the credibility of this exchange rate band slightly earlier, starting around mid-summer
1996.
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After the realignment of January 30, 1997, credibility of the exchange rate band could still be
rejected.  Yet, the percentage of traded options whose price was inconsistent with credibility of the new
band declined significantly, and remained stable through the end of the sample on July 30, 1997, at
around 20% of the traded options.
B.  Probability and Realignment Intensities of the Maxibands
As we did with the minibands above, we compute the estimated monthly probabilities and
intensities of devaluation (reported in Table 6) implied by the estimated PDF’s at the three different
horizons.   Devaluation probabilities were consistently large at all horizons during the first part of the
sample (“Regime II”), until the realignment of January 30, 1996.  After that devaluation, probabilities
were very close to zero until about November 1996, four months prior to the February 18, 1997
realignment, when the probabilities of devaluation began to steadily increase again.
Realignment intensities in Table 6 are expressed on an annualized basis as a percentage of the
existing upper band.  These numbers refer the product of the probability of a devaluation and the expected
size of the devaluation (measured from the upper band). At the beginning of January 1996, the estimated
35-day devaluation intensity was slightly higher than 10% annually. This suggests, for instance, a 50%
probability of a 2% depreciation of the spot rate beyond the upper band over a 35-day horizon.  This
number seems plausible given the government’s policy of aiming for a steady monthly nominal
devaluation of the Real of about 0.5-0.6%.   The low realignment intensities observed prior to the
following realignment on February 19, 1997 corroborates this point.  Estimated three-month realignment
intensities at the beginning of February 1997 are 2.75% while the estimated probability of the devaluation
was almost 98 percent.  This again indicates that, although a realignment was widely expected, the
expected devaluation of the spot rate from such a realignment was very small and of the same order as the
observed depreciations in the previous months.
Like our estimates of expected depreciations beyond the crawling peg, probabilities and
intensities of  realignments (devaluations beyond the maxibands) also prove sensitive to news affecting the
Brazilian economic and political situation.   For example, the failure to pass Social Security Reform
legislation (April-May 1996) and the Congressional bribery scandal (May 1997) increased both
realignment intensity and realignment probability, especially at the 91-day horizons.
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VI.  Economic Determinants of Realignment Intensity
To ascertain whether variation in realignment intensity can be explained by common
macroeconomic variables, we perform regressions whose dependent variable is the monthly estimates of
devaluation intensity and its lower bound, as estimated in Section V.  The macroeconomic variables used
are similar to those in Rose and Svensson (1994).  No lagged right-hand-side variables were included,
however, because of the limited number of left-hand-side observations available.
The specific equation used is:
Intensityt = a + b1(RER)t + b2 (Infl)t + b3(Output)t + b4(Trade)t + b5(FRES)t + b6(Money)t + et (9)
The explanatory variables on the RHS are:
· the real exchange rate (RER), determined using the nominal monthly average exchange rate,
the US PPI, and the Brazilian WPI;
· cumulative inflation (Infl), which is the difference between the Brazilian and US CPI's;
· Brazilian output divided by US output (Output);
· Brazilian trade balance divided by the US trade balance (Trade);
· Brazilian foreign reserves divided by US foreign reserves (FRES);
· and the ratio of Brazilian high-powered money to its US counterpart (Money).
All variables except inflation are expressed in logs.  On the left-hand-side, we use devaluation intensity
derived from the full estimated PDF.
Results from OLS regressions using equation (9) for the 35-day, 60-day, and 91-day intensity
data are reported in Table 7.7  We should first note the low power of these regressions owing to the small
number of observations in our sample.  The regression results clearly indicate the low explanatory power
of these macroeconomic variables.  For the specification using the 90-day realignment intensity, we can
not reject the hypothesis that all the coefficients equal zero.  None of the indicators is significant in all
three regressions.  Money is the only variable that has a significant coefficient in more than one
regression— with higher money growth associated with higher realignment intensity.  The coefficients on
Trade and on Reserves do have the expected sign and are significant in the regression of the 60-day
                                                       
7 The results reported here do not change qualitatively if one replaces the dependent variable (realignment
intensities) with either the probabilities of depreciations reported in Table 4 or the probabilities of
devaluations reported in Table 6.
21
intensity.  Increases in the Brazilian trade deficit and decreases in its level of reserves appear to increase
the intensity of realignment.  These economic linkages are not confirmed in regressions of the two other
horizons’ intensity, where the coefficients are insignificant and the sign changes.8  Given the small
number of observations, it is not appropriate to draw general conclusions from these estimates.
Nevertheless, the results are consistent with the general conclusions of Svensson and Rose (1994) and
Campa and Chang (1998): that macroeconomic variables are largely unable to explain intertemporal
movements in realignment risk.
VI.   Conclusion
This paper has used a new data set of exchange-traded options from August 1995 through July
1997 to derive risk-neutral probability density functions for the Real/Dollar exchange rate over horizons
ranging from one to three months.  The PDF is a superior indicator to a single point estimate of exchange
rate expectations, such as a forward rate or survey-based forecast, in that it assigns varying amounts of
probability to different possible outcomes.  Although we introduce some approximations to compensate for
sparse data, we make no assumptions about exchange rate dynamics. The PDF then can be used to analyze
both the crawling peg and the maxiband exchange rate regimes.  These two overlapping systems have
been in operation in Brazil since early 1995, several months after the June 1994 introduction of the Real
Plan, designed to combat inflation and currency depreciation.
In assessing market expectations under the crawling peg, we use the risk-neutral PDF to calculate
both the intensity and probability of depreciation beyond the crawling peg.  A high probability
accompanied by a relatively low intensity, for example, indicates that the market anticipates depreciation
beyond the peg, but most of this depreciation is concentrated just outside the peg.  Empirically, we find
that the credibility of the peg has increased over time, and that the occasional spikes in depreciation
intensity and probability can usually be explained by identifiable political or economic news in Brazil.
Our evaluation of the maxiband regime consists of two arbitrage-based tests of target zone
credibility, as well as a measure of devaluation intensity outside the band.   Tests based on arbitrage reject
credibility whenever observed option prices are inconsistent with zero probability lying outside the band.
When this occurs, devaluation intensity outside the band is positive. The numerical value of this intensity
                                                       
8 We performed similar regressions using the average monthly minimum intensity of realignment
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then provides a quantitative indicator of  markets’ questioning the maxiband regime.  Empirically, we are
usually able to reject credibility, but find that through our sample ending in July 1997, the intensity of
devaluation has fallen over time as the regime became increasingly  credible.
This paper also provides a more general methodology for extracting the risk-neutral PDF even
when data are limited.  In particular, we aggregate observations over several days, normalizing the option
price by the contemporaneous forward rate.  Our method involves fitting a single volatility smile to these
multi-day observation periods.  Assuming stationarity of the distribution over each period, this approach
results in more precision when relatively few options are observed, a common difficulty with many
emerging markets.
 Analysis of the shape of the PDFs over time also provides insight into market perceptions.  In
general, the PDFs appear to exhibit a greater degree of kurtosis and skewness (towards Real devaluation)
with time.  Increased kurtosis, i.e. fatter tails for a given level of volatility, suggests that increasingly
markets believed that if a depreciation were to occur, it would be a large depreciation.  Holding volatility
constant, an increase in kurtosis implies less probability of a devaluation outside the target zone, but a
larger expected devaluation if devaluation occurs.
We also run regressions seeking to identify macroeconomic determinants of realignment risk.
We find little evidence that standard macroeconomic indicators can explain observed realignment risk,
consistent with Rose and Svensson (1994) and Campa and Chang (1998).  Our observation of increasing
kurtosis over time suggests that devaluation outside the band is increasingly perceived as a rare large
event, rather than a more likely but not necessarily large event.
Overall, the paper’s findings reinforce earlier work on options’ superior ability, relative to
macroeconomic or interest-rate based indicators, to anticipate the periodic realignments of the exchange
rate bands.    By providing a more sensitive indicator of exchange rate risk— either in the form of
depreciation beyond the crawling peg or a realignment of the maxibands— we have also documented the
steady increase in exchange rate credibility during the first years of Brazil’s Real Plan.
                                                                                                                                                                    
computed according to equation (6) and the results were equally unsuccessful.
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Table 1a: Mean and Standard Deviation of Strikes
This table reports the mean and standard deviation (in parenthesis) of strikes for European call data in
three maturity ranges (1-30 days, 31-60 days, and 61-90 days) for the period 3/95 to 7/97.  The four
periods over which these statistics are computed correspond to different exchange rate band regimes:
March 10, 1995 through June 22, 1995 (.88-.93 R/$), June 23, 1995 through Jan 30, 1996 (.91-.99 R/$),
Jan 31, 1996 through February 18, 1997 (.97-1.06 R/$), and February 19, 1997 through July 30, 1997, the
end of data set (1.05-1.14 R/$).  The number of observations is listed below each statistic.
3/10/95 – 6/ 22/95 6/23/95 – 1/30/96 1/31/96 – 2/18/97 2/19/97 – 7/30/97
R/$ Band .88-.93 .91-.99 .97-1.06 1.05-1.14
1-30 Days, Mean 1.027 1.010 1.040 1.097
Std.Dev. (.227) (.138) (.051) (.050)
       # obs. 11 158 563 386
31-60 Days,
Mean
.853 .985 1.047 1.101
Std. Dev. (.066) (.040) (.050) (.031)
# obs. 14 204 740 437
61-90 Days .956 .991 1.046 1.107
Std. Dev. (.172) (.019) (.050) (.027)
# obs. 20 203 608 315
Table 1b: Percentage of Strikes Above to the Spot, Forward, and Upper-Band
This table reports the percentage of strike prices above the spot rate, forward rate and upper-bands, for
European call data in three maturity  ranges (1-30 days, 31-60 days, and 61-90 days), for the period 3/95
to 7/97.  The four periods over which these statistics are computed correspond to different exchange rate
band regimes: March 10, 1995 through June 22, 1995 (.88-.93 R/$), June 23, 1995 through Jan 30, 1996
(.91-.99 R/$), Jan 31, 1996 through February 18, 1997 (.97-1.06 R/$), and February 19, 1997 through July
30, 1997, the end of data set (1.05-1.14 R/$).
3/10/95 – 6/ 22/95 6/23/95 – 1/30/96 1/31/96 – 2/18/97 2/19/97 – 7/30/97
R/$ Band .88-.93 .91-.99 .97-1.06 1.05-1.14
1-30 Days
   Spot .64 .85 .94 .99
   Forward .55 .80 .82 .96
   Upper-Band .55 .40 .28 .14
31-60 Days
   Spot .43 .95 .97 1.00
   Forward .21 .77 .76 .89
   Upper-Band .21 .47 .33 .18
61-90 Days
   Spot .40 .995 .997 1.00
   Forward .15 .78 .77 .87
   Upper-Band .30 .65 .36 .21
4
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Table 2: Standard Deviation of Changes in the Forward and Spot Rates
This table reports the standard deviation of daily percent changes in the spot rate and three forward rates
relative over the four Real/Dollar maxiband regimes during the sample period, 3/95 to 7/97. Observations
on the forward rates are separated in three maturity ranges (1-30 days, 31-60 days, and 61-90 days).  The
four regimes are: March 10, 1995 through June 22, 1995 (.88-.93 R/$), June 23, 1995 through Jan 30,
1996 (.91-.99 R/$), Jan 31, 1996 through February 18, 1997 (.97-1.06 R/$), and February 19, 1997
through July 30, 1997, the end of the data set (1.05-1.14 R/$).  Number of observations is provided below
each statistic.
3/10/95 – 6/ 22/95 6/23/95 – 1/30/96 1/31/96 – 2/18/97 2/19/97 – 7/30/97
R/$ Band .88-.93 .91-.99 .97-1.06 1.05-1.14
Spot
    Std. Dev. 0.0045 0.0010 0.00073 0.00076
    # obs. 69 149 259 110
1-30 Day
    Std. Dev. .0065 .0026 .0015 .0017
    # obs. 67 146 247 107
31-60 Day
    Std. Dev. .0071 .0024 .0016 .0018
    # obs. 67 147 251 107
61-90 Day
    Std. Dev. .0079 .0026 .0018 .0018
    # obs. 67 146 240 102
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Table 3: Implied Volatilities from Real-U.S. Dollar Options
This table reports the mean and standard deviation of the implied volatilities (in percentage terms) of the
options in the sample, 3/95 to 7/97. Observations on the options are separated into three categories
defined by maturity (1-30 days, 31-60 days, and 61-90 days).  The four periods over which these statistics
are computed correspond to different exchange rate maxiband regimes: March 10, 1995 through June 22,
1995 (.88-.93 R/$), June 23, 1995 through Jan 30, 1996 (.91-.99 R/$), Jan 31, 1996 through February 18,
1997 (.97-1.06 R/$), and February 19, 1997 through July 30, 1997, the end of the data set (1.05-1.14 R/$).
The number of observations is provided below each statistic.
3/10/95 – 6/ 22/95 6/23/95 – 1/30/96 1/31/96 – 2/18/97 2/19/97 – 7/30/97
R/$ Band .88-.93 .91-.99 .97-1.06 1.05-1.14
1-30Day
  Mean 46.64 13.65 5.06 5.75
  Std. Dev. 29.20 19.85  6.68 6.43
  # obs. 11 151 520 385
31-60Day
  Mean 18.74 4.57 4.13 4.23
  Std. Dev. 7.83 5.96 4.48 3.41
  # obs. 14 202 702 433
61-90 Day
  Mean 19.85 4.37 3.48 3.59
  Std. Dev. 11.74 2.32 4.19 2.56
  # obs. 20 201 581 311
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Table 4: Probabilities of a 2% and of a 5% depreciation over 35, 60, and 91-day
horizons, 8/95-7/97.
This table reports the probability that the expected exchange rate will  depreciate by more than 2% and
5% over a given horizon.  These probabilities are estimated monthly from implied PDFs at three different
horizons (35, 60 and 91-days).
Date 35 Day 60 Day 91 Day
2 % 5% 2 % 5% 2 % 5%
Regime II: [.91-.99]
Aug-95 3.32 0.51 12.38 2.98 21.78 9.47
Sep-95 25.39 19.38 12.00 4.04 12.35 1.90
Oct-95 31.48 24.64 32.43 26.27 9.68 1.82
Nov-95 15.88 12.70 35.18 24.59 8.26 1.57
Dec-95 28.00 18.80 10.79 7.75 2.74 0.24
Jan-96 22.34 14.56 3.76 0.86 4.72 0.56
Feb-96 0.50 0.02 2.12 0.17 3.50 0.37
Regime III: [.97-1.06]
Mar-96 2.95 2.25 2.76 0.78 4.42 1.04
Apr-96 0.20 0.01 0.03 0.00 11.35 9.16
May-96 0.52 0.06 0.82 0.08 37.15 28.82
Jun-96 0.43 0.02 7.09 5.05 2.01 0.18
Jul-96 0.06 0.00 0.06 0.00 1.98 0.15
Aug-96 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.00 . .
Sep-96 0.66 0.04 2.26 0.20 2.42 0.19
Oct-96 0.00 0.00 . . 0.02 0.00
Nov-96 0.00 0.00 0.30 0.00 0.84 0.01
Dec-96 1.34 0.07 0.12 0.00 0.00 0.00
Jan-97 0.06 0.00 6.28 2.17 2.35 0.09
Feb-97 0.33 0.00 0.89 0.00 0.00 0.00
Mar-97 0.33 0.00 0.01 0.00 1.96 0.22
Regime IV: [1.05-1.14]
Apr-97 0.43 0.00 0.46 0.00 0.11 0.00
May-97 0.03 0.00 1.81 0.09 65.21 53.23
Jun-97 0.19 0.00 0.83 0.00 1.12 0.00
Jul-97 0.23 0.00 0.23 0.00 0.25 0.00
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Table 5: Significant Events Affecting the Real-Dollar Exchange Rate,
November 1994 – July 1997
Table presents a list of significant world or Brazilian events that occurred over the period covered by the data.
Date Event(s)
1994:   March Unit of Real Value introduced as basis for all Brazilian financial contracts and indices
            July Real first introduced as official Brazilian currency
            November U.S. Congress approves GATT
            December Devaluation of  Mexican Peso
1995:   January Continued depreciation of Mexican Peso
            February $40 billion bail-out plan for Mexico announced
            March First Real/Dollar Maxibands introduced  [.88-.93].
Mexican Peso continues to tumble
Argentina seeks $3 billion in credit lines to counter contagion effects from Mexican
crisis
            April Mexican peso shows steady appreciation / Mexican stocks start to rebound / Four
largest Japanese brokerage houses announce $1 billion in losses
            May Dollar begins to appreciate against yen / trade gap with Japan declines
            June Realignment of the Real/Dollar Maxibands. New bands [.91-.99].
Dow Jones experiences second largest decline in history
            August Toyota Invests $150 million in new car manufacturing facility in Brazil
            October Mexico begins repayment of US loan package.
            November Delays in approval of constitutional reform for Social Security, Indexation and Taxes
1996:   January Realignment of the Real/Dollar Maxibands. New bands [.97-1.06].
FEF established by the Brazilian congress to eliminate fiscal deficit, renewed for 18
months
            February US bond prices tumble, biggest drop in 7 months
            March Dow experiences 3rd largest decline ever at beginning of month, then reaches record
levels March 18
            May Yields on US 30 year treasuries exceed 7% for first time in months
            June Brazilian government suffers humiliating defeat on Social Security Reform in
Congress
            July Dow tumbles;  219 point swing in trading
            August Argentina’s finance minister is replaced raising uncertainty in emerging markets
            November Brazilian municipal elections are held with mixed results for the party in power
            December Peruvian terrorists seize Lima residence of Japanese Ambassador /
300 point decline and recovery of Dow
1997:   January Mexico repays final $3.5 billion of US loan package
            February Realignment of the Real/Dollar Maxibands. New bands [1.05-1.14].
Constitutional amendment for reelection of high officials passes lower house
            May Scandal on the government buying some congressional votes.
Transaction tax is introduced to “cool” the economy
Massive speculative attack on the Thai baht
            July The baht devalues by about 15-20 percent
Philippines, Indonesia, Singapore and Malaysia widened or abandoned their existing
exchange rate bands
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Table 6: Probabilities of Realizations outside the Maxiband and Intensities of
Maxiband Realignment, 8/95-7/97
This table reports the total probability of the expected exchange rate realizations outside the maxiband and
the annualized expected intensities of realignment (as a % of the upper end of the band) from the
estimated PDFs at three different horizons (35, 60 and 91-days).
Probability (in %) outside the Upper Band      Intensity of Realignment
Date:
(start of Month) 35-Day 60-day 91-Day 35-Day 60-day 91-Day
Regime II: [.91-.99]
Aug-95 2.01 7.82 25.63 0.19 1.04 3.52
Sep-95 24.50 15.97 35.29 10.95 2.42 2.33
Oct-95 31.97 32.85 26.40 15.16 16.58 1.48
Nov-95 15.88 39.53 30.69 7.66 15.55 1.71
Dec-95 31.79 13.22 9.80 11.67 5.02 0.39
Jan-96 36.95 22.58 33.85 10.37 1.29 1.45
Regime III: [.97-1.06]
Feb-96 0.00 0.04 0.19 0.00 0.00 0.01
Mar-96 1.93 0.48 0.80 0.67 0.07 0.08
Apr-96 0.00 0.00 8.79 0.00 0.00 2.59
May-96 0.04 0.05 28.56 0.00 0.00 7.96
Jun-96 0.02 5.16 0.33 0.00 1.95 0.02
Jul-96 0.00 0.00 0.47 0.00 0.00 0.02
Aug-96 0.00 0.00               . 0.00 0.00               .
Sep-96 0.19 1.11 2.21 0.01 0.09 0.12
Oct-96 0.00               . 0.01 0.00               . 0.00
Nov-96 0.00 0.46 3.27 0.00 0.01 0.09
Dec-96 3.61 1.12 3.45 0.20 0.03 0.05
Jan-97 4.92 25.59 38.11 0.12 2.46 1.50
Feb-97 0.00 50.37 97.96 0.00 1.55 2.75
Regime IV: [1.05-1.14]
Mar-97 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.01
Apr-97 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
May-97 0.00 0.06 54.80 0.00 0.00 20.21
Jun-97 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00
Jul-97 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
32
Table 7: Relationship between Realignment Intensities and Fundamentals, 8/95-7/97
This table reports the estimated coefficients from OLS regressions of the estimated monthly realignment
intensities on a set of macroeconomic indicators.  The indicators are: RER – real/US$ real exchange rate,
INFL – Brazilian inflation rate, OUTPUT – index of industrial production, TRADE – trade balance,
FRES – Brazilian foreign reserves, and MONEY – high-powered money.  All variables except INFL are
expressed as the log of the ratio of the value for Brazil of the corresponding measure to that for the U.S.
Standard errors appear in italics below each reported coefficient.
35-Day 60-Day 91-Day
RER 0.17 0.19 -0.29
0.97 1.33 -1.27
INFL 0.00 0.00 0.00
-1.05 -0.42 0.19
OUTPUT 0.02 0.07 -0.02
0.68 2.12* -0.42
TRADE 0.00 -0.02 0.02
0.14 -2.04* 0.93
FRES -0.01 -0.05 0.01
-0.35 -4.32* 0.13
MONEY 0.04 0.04 -0.01
2.05* 1.86** -0.37
Adj. R2 0.38 0.60 -0.14
N. Obs. 21 25 25
33
Figures 1a-1d: Real/Dollar Spot Rate and 30, 60 and 90 day Forward Rates
34
35
Figures 2a-2c: Implied Exchange Rate Probability Distributions 10/94-7/97, 35, 60 and 91 days
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Figures 3a-3l: Arbitrage-Based Tests of Exchange Rate Credibility
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Figures 4a-4c: Probabilities and Intensities of Realignment, 5/95-8/97
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